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RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-EQUITABLE MODIFICATION -PRIVATE
TESTAMENTARY TRUST-The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia has adopted a doctrine of equitable modification, to be applied
to a non-charitable devise or bequest which violates the Rule Against
Perpetuities in order to revise the instrument in a fashion that effec-
tuates a testator's general intent within the limitations established by
the Rule.
Berry v. Union National Bank, 262 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1980).
On June 20, 1975, Clara Clayton Post died testate.1 Her will contained
a series of specific bequests2 and created a private educational trust in
favor of descendants of her late husband's brothers and sisters.' The
class of descendants who were to benefit from the trust were those
who gained admission to an accredited institution of higher learning,
and maintained satisfactory standing in scholarship and in other re-
quirements of the institution." The trust was to last for twenty-five
years or until the principal was reduced to five-thousand dollars,
whichever occurred first.' At the termination of the trust, the principal
and interest were to be distributed per stirpes to the then-living
descendants of the testatrix' husband's brothers and sisters.'
The executrix, Josephine Berry, recognized that the trust potential-
ly violated the Rule Against-Perpetuities7 and entered into a trust ter-
1. Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank, 262 S.E.2d 766, 767 (W. Va. 1980).
2. Id. at 767-68. The specific bequests were made to the testatrix' heirs at law and
to others. Id. The heirs at law challenged the validity of the testamentary trust because
they would further benefit if the trust property passed through intestacy. Brief of Ap-
pellant at 5.
3. 262 S.E.2d at 768 & n.1. The instrument declared that the purpose of the trust
was to fulfill the testatrix' late husband's wishes for the disposition of the funds involved.
Id. at 768 n.1.
4. Id. at 768 n.1. The trustee had absolute discretion to determine whether potential
trust beneficiaries qualified as members of the class, whethei all or part of the income
and principal should be used to meet educational expenses, and for what particular ex-
penses the funds would be used and how they would be paid. Id. at 768 & n.1.
5. Id. at 768 & n.1.
6. Id. The distribution on termination of the trust was not conditioned by the educa-
tional requirements imposed upon those who benefitted during the life of the trust. Id
7. John Chipman Gray formulated the classic statement of the Rule: "No interest is
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest." J.C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed.
1942) [hereinafter cited as GRAY]. See generally J. DUKEMINIER, PERPETUITIES LAW IN Ac-
TION (1962) [hereinafter cited as DUKEMINIER]; GRAY; R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES (1966); J. MORRIS & W. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (2d ed.
1962); Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1938); Leach, Perpetuities:
The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Nutshell
Revisited]; Lynn, A Practical Guide to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1964 DUKE L.J.
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mination agreement with the trustee, Union National Bank of
Clarksburg, to amend the twenty-five year provision to twenty-one
years. The agreement also required the executrix to initiate a
declaratory judgment action to determine whether the trust violated
the Rule and whether the agreement itself was appropriate.8
The trial court held that the trust violated the Rule and was
therefore void, and granted a summary judgment to the testatrix'
heirs at law. It also ruled that the executrix and trustee had no
authority to agree to amend the trust.9
On appeal," the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
unanimously reversed11 the lower court's ruling that the trust was void
under the Rule. 2 It held that in order to effectuate the testatrix'
207. In Berry the interests of all potential trust beneficiaries would have had to vest
within 21 years after lives in being when the trust was created. By its terms, the trust
could have lasted for 25 years after the testatrix' death. Therefore, there was no
assurance that the interests of all beneficiaries would have vested within 21 years after
her death. Similarly, there was no assurance that all interests would have vested within
21 years of any other measuring life as the others may have died within four years after
the testatrix. Because the class of potential beneficiaries included unborn descendants, no
member could have been considered a measuring life for the gift. See DUKEMINIER, supra,
at 8. For these reasons, the interest of any potential beneficiary could have vested beyond
the period of the Rule. Under the common law Rule, if a gift is to be divided among a
class of persons, and the interest of any one of them could vest too remotely, the entire
class gift fails. See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.26 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); GRAY,
supra, § 373; Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 HARV. L.
REV. 1329 (1938). Because the interests of the trust's remaindermen could vest 25 years
after the testatrix' death, the same possibility of vesting more than 21 years after the
lives in being renders them invalid. See G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 213 (2d rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT].
8. 262 S.E.2d at 768.
9. Id.
10. The appeal was taken by the executrix. Id. The testatrix' heirs at law claimed
that she lacked standing to challenge the declaratory judgment as she was not a potential
distributee of the trust. Id. at 768-69. They also argued that she was breaching her
fiduciary duty to remain impartial in the distribution of the estate. Motion to Dismiss and
Reply Brief of Ellen Clayton and Arthur Clayton, Appellees, at 3-4. The court held that
under the West Virginia Code an executrix is a necessary party to, and may appeal from,
a declaratory judgment on the construction of a trust. 262 S.E.2d at 769 & nn.3, 4 & 5.
See W. VA. CODE §§ 55-13-4, -7, -11, -12 (1981); W. VA. COD8 § 58-5-1 (1978); W. VA. CONST.
art. 8, § 3.
11. Justice Harshbarger wrote the opinion of a unanimous court.
12. 262 S.E.2d at 772. The court quoted its prior statement of the Rule that: "[E]very
executory limitation, in order to be valid, shall be so limited that it must necessarily vest,
if at all, within a life or lives in being, ten months and twenty-one years thereafter, the
period of gestation being allowed only in those cases in which it is a factor." Id. at 770
(quoting Goetz v. Old Nat'l Bank, 140 W. Va. 422, 441-42, 84 S.E.2d 759, 772 (1954)). See
Greco v. Meadow River Coal and Land Co., 145 W. Va. 153, 113 S.E.2d 79 (1960); First
Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., 139 W. Va. 130, 79 S.E.2d 675 (1953);
Prichard v. Prichard, 91 W. Va. 398, 113 S.E. 256 (1922); McCreery v. Johnston, 90 W. Va.
80, 110 S.E. 464 (1922). See also note 7 supra.
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general intent of providing for the education of the designated
beneficiaries, the trust would be equitably modified to fall within the
limitations established by the Rule.'3 The court therefore reduced the
trust's durational provision from twenty-five to twenty-one years. 4
Because of its disposition of the case on the merits, the court did not
rule on the propriety of the agreement between the executrix and
trustee.",
In reaching its conclusion, the court discussed four general prin-
ciples which govern the interpretation of wills.'6 The court first noted
that a testator's intent should be ascertained and implemented"' unless
it violates a positive rule of law or public policy." Furthermore, the
strong presumption against intestacy requires that a will be construed
to avoid total or partial intestacy." The court also determined that a
general intent is given preference over a specific one if the two appear
to be contradictory." The court stated that these principles which re-
quire a court to honor a testator's intent and avoid intestacy conflict
with the Rule's purpose of preventing a testator from controlling the
devolution of his property for an inordinate time."
To remedy this conflict, the court adopted a doctrine of equitable
modification to be applied to a non-charitable devise or bequest which
violates the Rule." According to the court, the purpose of equitable
modification is to revise an instrument in a fashion that effectuates a
testator's general intent within the limitations established by the
13. 262 S.E.2d at 771-72.
14. Id. at 772.
15. Id. at 768 n.2.
16. Id at 769. The court cited only West Virginia cases as authority for these general
principles, declaring that those cases are in accord with the vast majority of other
jurisdictions. Id. at 769 n.6.
17. See Wheeler Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499 (W. Va. 1977);
Wheeler Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va. 703, 37 S.E.2d 563 (1946);
Bell's Adm'r v. Humphrey, 8 W. Va. 1 (1874).
18. 262 S.E.2d at 769. See Emmert v. Old Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 236 (W. Va. 1978).
19. 262 S.E.2d at 769. See Rastle v. Gamsjager, 151 W. Va. 499, 153 S.E.2d 403 (1967);
Cowherd v. Fleming, 84 W. Va. 227, 100 S.E. 84 (1919).
20. 262 S.E.2d at 769. See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Shriver, 75 W. Va. 401, 83 S.E.
1011 (1915).
21. 262 S.E.2d at 770.
22. Id. at 770-71. Justice Harshbarger stated that the equitable modification doctrine
is akin to the doctrine of cy pres which was adopted by the West Virginia legislature in
the area of charitable trusts. Id. See W. VA. CODE § 35-2-2 (1966). He noted 18 states that
have adopted a cy pres approach to non-charitable gifts; 15 statutorily and 3 judicially.
262 S.E.2d at 770 n.8. Citing a developing trend to ameliorate the harsh consequences of
"remorseless application" of the Rule, the court noted that other theories have been
employed to modify the effect of the Rule. Id. at 770. Alternative theories include the
"wait-and-see" doctrine, abolition of the fertile octogenarian and unborn widow rules, and
the theory of "separable alternative contingencies." See id at 770 n.8. See also notes 36 &
37 infra.
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Rule.23 The court declared that an otherwise void instrument will be
revised to effectuate a testator's intent if four conditions are met: The
testator's intent must be expressed in the will or be readily deter-
minable; the testator's general intent cannot violate the Rule; the par-
ticular intent, which does violate the Rule, must not be a critical
aspect of the testamentary scheme; and the proposed modification
must effectuate the testator's general intent, avoid the consequences
of intestacy, and conform to the policy considerations underlying the
Rule.24
The court then applied these criteria to the Post trust. The court
found that the testatrix' general intent to provide for the education of
the designated beneficiaries was clearly expressed in the will.'
Although her particular intent, to maintain the trust for twenty-five
years or until the principal was reduced to five-thousand dollars,
violated the Rule, 6 the court found no indication that the testatrix in-
tended the duration of the trust to be critical to the testamentary
scheme.' Because modifying the duration of the trust would effectuate
the testatrix' general intent and avoid intestacy without contravening
the purpose of the perpetuities limitation, the court held that the trust
qualified for equitable modification. 8
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities' emerged as a tool for
enhancing the alienability of property by prohibiting a testator from
23. 262 S.E.2d at 771.'The court announced that it supports tle policies underlying
the Rule and will deny validity to an interest which vests beyond its prescribed period.
However, before allowing an application of the Rule to "totally obliterate" a testamentary
scheme, the court will determine whether an instrument can be equitably modified to
comport with the Rule's underlying policy. Id
24. Id
25. Id- The court found a clear expression of intent in the testatrix' statement that it
was the desire of her late husband that the funds be used for the education of the
designated beneficiaries. Id
26. 262 S.E.2d at 771. See Colorado Nat'l Bank v. McCabe, 143 Colo. 21, 353 P.2d 385
(1960); Beverlin v. First Nat'l Bank, 151 Kan. 307, 98 P.2d 200 (1940); BOGERT, supra note
7, § 213.
27. 262 S.E.2d at 771.
28. Id. The guardian ad litem, appointed by the trial court to represent the interests
of unborn beneficiaries of the trust, had claimed on appeal that there were potentially
three classes of infant beneficiaries whose interests were adverse to one another. He
claimed that he could not represent all three without conflict. Id. Therefore, the Supreme
Court of Appeals directed that, on remand, additional guardians ad litem be appointed to
represent the interests of the various classes of infant and unborn beneficiaries who were
not represented in the first action. Id. at 772. See Chapman v. Branch, 72 W. Va. 54, 78
S.E. 235 (1913); Hays v. Camden's Heirs, 38 W. Va. 109, 18 S.E. 461 (1893); W. VA. CODE §
56-4-10 (1966).
29. See notes 7 & 12 supra.
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controlling its devolution for an inordinate period of time." An or-
thodox application of the Rule renders void any contingent future in-
terest" if there is a possibility32 that it could vest more than twenty-
one years after the deaths of certain persons who were alive when the
interest was created.3 The result is that property passes as though the
testator had died intestate.'
Recognizing this result as harsh,3 a number of jurisdictions have
modified the common law Rule." The Berry court has joined those
jurisdictions which have adopted a cy pres approach to modification."
30. See Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand. Reflections on the Origins
of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19, 20 (1977); Simes, The Policy
Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 707, 708-12 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Simes].
31. See GRAY, supra note 7, § 99; L. ShIES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE IN-
TERESTS § 1235 (2d ed. 1956).
32. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 7, at 9-14; GRAY, supra note 7, § 214. Under the com-
mon law Rule, an interest is void if, at the time it was created, there existed a mere
possibility that it would vest beyond the period of the Rule. It is irrelevant that the in-
terest probably will vest or actually did vest within the period. Id. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Preston, 226 Ill. 447, 80 N.E. 1001 (1907) (gift conditioned on probate of testator's will
void, because possibility existed that probate would not be completed until more than 21
years after testator's death).
33. See notes 7 & 12 supra. See Allen, Perpetuities: Who Are the Lives in Being? 81
LAW Q. REV. 106 (1965); Note, Understanding the Measuring Life in the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 265 (1974).
34. See DUKEMINIER, supra note 7, at 44.
35. See Brown, Perpetuities Reform: Approaches & Reproaches, 49 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 611, 611 (1974) (reasonable intentions are snuffed because of short-sighted drafts-
manship); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1349,
1349 (1954) (Rule usually operates to defeat reasonable dispositions of property); Leach,
Perpetuities: What Legislatures, Courts and Practitioners Can Do About the Follies of
the Rule, 13 U. KAN. L. REV. 351, 351 (1965) (penalty inflicted, not on testator, but on inno-
cent intended beneficiaries) [hereinafter cited as What Legislatures, Courts and Practi-
tioners Can Do].
36. See BOGERT, supra note 26, § 214 (discussion of the status of the Rule in each
state). Some states have adopted a "wait-and-see" approach. Instead of determining at the
time the interest is created whether it is possible that it will vest beyond the period of
the Rule, the parties wait until the end of the 21-year period to see if the interest actually
does vest. If so, it is valid. Otherwise, it is void. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6104(B) (Pur-
don 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.010 (1967) (statute applies only to trusts). Several
states have enacted more limited "wait-and-see" legislation. Instead of waiting until the
end of the 21-year period to see if the interest actually has vested, these states examine
the interest at the end of the lives in being to determine whether it is possible that it will
vest beyond the period of the Rule. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-95 (West 1958); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 689.22(2) (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101 (1964); MD.
EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-103(a) (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 1 (West
1977).
37. See In re Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 52 Hawaii 40, 469 P.2d 183 (1970);
Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962); Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31
A. 900 (1891); CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.5 (West Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1979) (cy
1981
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Under cy pres, an instrument that violates the Rule is reformed to ap-
proximate the intention of the testator as nearly as possible within the
limits of the Rule." The doctrine traditionally was applied only to
charitable trusts, 9 but recently has found wider application to private,
non-charitable gifts such as the educational trust in Berry."0 Adoption
of the equitable modification doctrine in Berry has made West Virginia
one of only four states to have judicially modified the Rule's applica-
tion to non-charitable gifts using this approach. 1
pres as to trusts only); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 422.555(2) (Vernon Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 60, § 75 (West 1980-1981); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 1291b, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1978). It is
suggested that the Supreme Court of Kansas adopted a cy pres approach "through the
back door" in In re Foster's Estate, 190 Kan. 498, 376 P.2d 784 (1962) (not mentioning cy
pres, court totally eliminated void alternative contingency on gift in order to effectuate
other valid one). See Nutshell Revisited, supra note 7, at 983 & n.48.
Some states have adopted a more limited cy pres approach through age reduction
statutes. See note 82 and accompanying text infra. Others couple cy pres and "wait-and-
see." This approach modifies interests which have not yet vested after the 21-year period
of waiting. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Baldwin 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2131.08(C) (Page 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975). This approach has been recom-
mended by the Advisory Committee to the American Law Institute. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 1.4-.5 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1979).
38. See Leach, Perpetuities: Cy Pres on the March, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1381, 1383
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Cy Pres on the March].
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959); A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 399 (2d ed. 1956); Chester, Cy Pres: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 IND. L.J. 407 (1979)
(development of cy pres in the area of charitable trusts). See also note 22 supra.
40. See Cy Pres on the March, supra note 38 (evolution of the cy pres doctrine in the
area of non-charitable gifts). As early as 1891, New Hampshire adopted the doctrine and
applied it to a private trust. Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891). However,
the doctrine lay dormant for the period of about 60 years following. Cy Pres on the
March, supra note 38, at 1383-85.
41. See In re Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 52 Hawaii 40, 469 P.2d 183 (1970);
Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962); Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31
A. 900 (1891).
Before the Berry decision, the common law Rule Against Perpetuities was strictly ap-
plied by the West Virginia courts. See Greco v. Meadow River Coal and Land Co., 145 W.
Va. 153, 113 S.E.2d 79 (1960); Brookover v. Grimm, 118 W. Va. 227, 190 S.E. 697 (1937);
Prichard v. Prichard, 91 W. Va. 398, 113 S.E. 256 (1922). Both the West Virginia Constitu-
tion and the West Virginia Code provide that any change in a common law rule is to be
made by the legislature. See W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 13; W. VA. CODE § 2-1-1 (1979). Until
Berry, the West Virginia court consistently refused to modify the Rule, holding it within
the province of the legislature to do so. See, e.g., First Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Gideon-
Broh Realty Co., 139 W. Va. 130, 152-53, 79 S.E.2d 675, 687 (1953). Perhaps the initiative
taken by the court in Berry was influenced by judicial modification in other jurisdictions
and by advocates of judicial, rather than legislative reform. See 52 Hawaii at 43, 469 P.2d
at 185 (Rule is a creature of judicial construction and its growth purely one of judicial
wisdom unless legislature acts); GRAY, supra note 7, § 870 (process of adjudication is one
of clearing and simplification; tendency of legislation is to make Rule more stringent);
Brown, Perpetuities Reform: Approaches & Reproaches, 49 NOTRE DAME LAw. 611, 626
(1974) (specific statutes for specific situations create an inflexible and complicated system
580 Vol. 19:575
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Proponents of cy pres urge that its expanded application to non-
charitable gifts is long overdue because of the Rule's destruction of
otherwise legitimate future interests.42 However, critics of the ap-
proach fear that it provides a court with unfettered discretion to
rewrite a will and substitute a new intent for that of the testator.3
Critics aver that courts applying cy pres will reform limitations on
gifts in an unpredictable manner," making nebulous speculations about
testators' intentions 5 and adopting strained interpretations of wills
solely for the purpose of saving contingent interests."'
A response to these criticisms emerges in a cy pres approach that
appraises the importance of a testator's invalid particular intent before
modification of an instrument that violates the Rule. In Carter v.
Berry7 the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted a doctrine of equitable
approximation and applied it to a private testamentary trust. 8 The
Carter court found that the testator's dominant intent was to provide
for his grandchildren." An intent that no grandchild benefit until the
youngest reached age twenty-five was found to be secondary.' The
court reduced the age contingency to twenty-one years, effectuating
the dominant intent. 1 However, the court modified the instrument only
after determining that the invalid secondary intent was not such an in-
tegral part of the testamentary scheme that the testator would prefer
the entire instrument to be inoperative.2
of perpetuities reform); Smith, Perpetuities in New Jersey: A Plea for Judicial
Supremacy, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 80, 80 (1969) (case-by-case refinement preferable to major
legislative incursions). See also McCauley, The Common Law as a Bar to Judicial Legisla-
tion, 71 W. VA. L. REV. 341, 343 (1969) (suggests West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
will change a common law rule if it disagrees with the rule and the legislature does not
act).
42. See Cy Pres on the March, supra note 38, at 1383; Quarles, The Cy Pres Doc-
trine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule Against Perpetuities and Trusts for
Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U. L.Q. 384, 384-85 (1949).
43. See, e.g., 52 Hawaii at 48, 469 P.2d at 188 (Kobayashi, J., dissenting); Gray,
General and Particular Intent in Connection with the Rule Against Perpetuities, 9 HARV.
L. REV. 242, 251 (1895) [hereinafter cited as General and Particular Intent].
44. Simes, supra note 30, at 736,
45. Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest? 56 MICH. L.
REV. 683, 718 (1958).
46. 84 HARV. L. REV. 738, 745 (1971). See also Schuyler, The Art of Interpretation in
Future Interest Cases, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1423-24 (1964) (events completely unan-
ticipated by testator occur and it is impossible to infer what he would have wanted; but
courts see function as preventing intestacy and stretch judgment to feign discovery of in-
tent that never existed).
47. 243 Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962).
48. Id. at 376-78, 140 So. 2d at 855-56.
49. Id. at 377, 140 So. 2d at 855.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 366, 376-77, 140 So. 2d at 850, 855.
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Like the Mississippi court, the West Virginia court in Berry has
adopted a cy pres approach that requires a survey of a testator's par-
ticular intent. The Berry court's four-step checklist for modification
enunciates the requirement even more explicitly than did the
Mississippi court. 3 The Berry court held that a devise or bequest will
not be modified if the testator's particular intent violates the Rule and
is critical to the testamentary scheme.' Therefore, despite the court's
recognition that an orthodox application of the Rule conflicts with the
principles of avoiding intestacy and effectuating intent,55 it has refused
to rescue an interest if the testator's critical purpose cannot be served
by the modification. Thus, the Berry approach represents an exercise
of caution; that is, the court will hesitate to speculate about a testator's
probable intent in those cases in which the court has determined that
the essence of the testator's dispositive plan exceeds the limitations of
the Rule.
In contrast, the courts of New Hampshire and Hawaii more liberally
effectuate general intent without requiring an examination of the im-
portance of the violative particular intent. In Edgerly v. Barker the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire adopted a cy pres approach57 and
reduced a forty-year age contingency on a gift to the testator's grand-
children to twenty-one years.' Without discussing the possible impor-
tance of the forty-year limitation, the court held that a testator's par-
ticular intent will be sacrificed in order to effectuate the general one. 9
The Edgerly court declared that it would refuse to effectuate a general
intent only if the instrument expressly stated that the testator preferred
dying wholly or partially intestate."5 The court's proclivity to effec-
tuate any general intent to avoid intestacy is illustrated by its declara-
tion that only a testator suffering from a mental disorder would prefer
intestacy.1
53. See 262 S.E.2d at 771.
54. Id. The Carter court stated that if it could be inferred that the testator would not
prefer the valid part of the instrument to stand alone, then the entire gift should fail,
rather than reducing the age contingency. 243 Miss. at 366, 376-77, 140 So. 2d at 850, 855.
55. See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
56. 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891).
57. Id. at 467, 31 A. at 912. In 1953, New Hampshire also judicially adopted a "second
look" approach, which is analogous to "wait-and-see." If a decision on the validity of an in-
terest is made at a time when events which have actually occurred indicate that the in-
terest will vest within the period of the Rule, the interest is valid. This is so, even though
a possibility of its vesting beyond the Rule existed at the time the interest was created.
See Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 231-32, 97 A.2d 207, 212 (1953). See also
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.35 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) (discusses the "second look"
doctrine as it has traditionally applied to powers of appointment).
58. 66 N.H. at 475, 31 A. at 916.
59. Id. at 467, 31 A. at 912.
60. Id- at 474-75, 31 A. at 916.
61. Id. at 475, 31 A. at 916.
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The Edgerly decision has been criticized as a substitution of the
court's intent for that of the testator."2 John Chipman Gray argued
that by disregarding the forty-year provision, the court may have
enlarged the intended class of beneficiaries and distributed shares of
the testator's estate to persons whom he never meant to benefit . 3 In
addition, enlarging the class would give intended beneficiaries an
unintended smaller share of the estate. The Berry test for modification
would require a determination of the significance of the forty-year pro-
vision. If the age contingency were critical to the testator's plan,
modification would be denied. The Berry approach would allow an or-
thodox application of the Rule to render the interest void rather than
supply beneficiaries with capital at a time when the testator may have
determined they are not sufficiently mature to manage it.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in In re Estate of Chun Quan Yee
Hop," was confronted with a private testamentary trust which was to
terminate at the death of the testator's wife or thirty years after the
testator's death, whichever last occurred. 5 The Hawaii court adopted
an equitable approximation doctrine6 and reduced the thirty-year
alternative to twenty-one years. The court held that equitable approx-
imation requires that an interest which violates the Rule be reformed
in a manner which most closely approximates the intention of the
testator." The Hawaii court did not discuss the difference between the
general and particular intents, nor did it discuss the possible
significance of the thirty-year limitation. The approach is a liberal one
and permits reformation restrained only by an obligation to carry out
a testator's general intent.9 Contrasted with Berry, such an approach
may more readily become the target of cy pres critics. For example, if
the thirty-year provision were critical to the testator's plan, the Berry
court would presumably discover its importance and deny modification.
If the Hawaii court, however, does not consider the importance of the
provision, it risks abandoning the essence of the testator's scheme as it
begins its search for a general intent. To critics, the court has also
begun to impose its own intent on the testator.
62. See General and Particular Inten supra note 43, at 251.
63. IdM at 246-47. Gray argued that the Edgerly court assumed that the persons
whom the testator intended to benefit remained the same, and only the time limitation
had changed. Gray admonished that six grandchildren may reach age 21 but only one
reach 40. Thus, shares are given to five persons whom the testator never meant to take.
Id.
64. 52 Hawaii 40, 469 P.2d 183 (1970).
65. Id at 41, 469 P.2d at 184.
66. Id. at 46, 469 P.2d at 187.
67. Id at 47, 469 P.2d at 187.
68. Id. at 46, 469 P.2d at 187. The court's holding reflects its definition of the
equitable approximation doctrine.
69. See 84 HARV. L. REV. 738, 740 (1971).
1981
Duquesne Law Review
Several states have legislatively adopted a cy pres approach to
modification of non-charitable gifts which violate the Rule."0 Some have
enacted full cy pres statutes.7 Full cy pres statutes provide for a
liberal reformation of an instrument in order to fully effectuate a
testator's general intent, regardless bf the particular reason that the
instrument violates the Rule.
7 2
In 1974, the California Court of Appeal interpreted the state's full
cy pres statute for the first time. 3 In Ghiglia v. Ghiglia the court held
that the statute requires a full and liberal effectuation of a testator's
general intent. 5 The court therefore reduced a thirty-five year age con-
tingency to twenty-one years, despite its recognition that it may have
been of importance to the testator that his grandchildren not benefit
until the mature age of thirty-five. 8 The court reasoned that the
thirty-five year provision did not necessitate a conclusion that the
testator would want his general trust plan to fail."
In Reed v. McGinness"8 the California Court of Appeal reduced a
fifty-year age contingency to twenty-one years. 9 The court, citing
Ghiglia, held that the statute imposes a duty on the court to liberally
effectuate a testator's intent in order to save testamentary gifts when-
ever possible. 0 The court did not discuss the importance to the
testator of the fifty-year limitation.
The interpretations of the California full cy pres statute result in a
disregard for a testator's particular intent and mandate liberal effec-
70. See note 37 supra.
71. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 715.5 (West Supp. 1981) which states that:
No interest in real or personal property is either void or voidable as in violation
of [the common law rule against perpetuities] if and to the extent that it can be
reformed or construed ... to give effect to the general intent of the creator of the
interest, whenever the general intent can be ascertained. This section shall be
liberally construed and applied to validate such interests to the fullest extent con-
sistent with such ascertained intent.
Id.
See also IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (1979) (applies bnly to trusts); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 422.555(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 75 (West 1980-1981); TEx. CIV. CODE ANN.
tit. 1291b, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
72. See Cy Pres on the March, supra note 38, at 1386; What Legislatures, Courts and
Practitioners Can Do, supra note 35, at 357.
73. Ghiglia v. Ghiglia, 42 Cal. App. 3d 433, 116 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1974) (interests of
testator's grandchildren in testamentary trust to vest as each reached age 35).
74. Id
75. Id. at 442, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
76. Id
77. Id.
78. 70 Cal. App. 3d 355, 138 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1977) (residuary gift in will to grandnieces
and grandnephews to vest when the youngest reached 50 years of age).
79. Id at 365, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
80. Id. at 364, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
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tuation of a general one in an effort to save testamentary gifts. The
California decisions may reinforce critics' fears that courts applying
the cy pres doctrine will be inclined to speculate and adopt strained in-
terpretations of wills in order to save contingent interests." To critics,
a modification made in disregard of an age contingency as great as fif-
ty years may reflect a clearly unintended dispositive scheme. Under
the Berry approach, if the fifty-year provision were critical to the
testator, the instrument would not be modified, thereby preventing an
effectuation of intent that would surprise the testator.
A paucity of cases in other jurisdictions interpreting full cy pres
statutes similar to California's renders speculative a conclusion that
these statutes will be interpreted in conformity with the California
cases. This is possible, however, if the California decisions are deemed
persuasive by other jurisdictions.
Other states have adopted more limited cy pres legislation which
permits reformation of age contingencies to twenty-one years if the
sole reason an interest violates the Rule is because it is contingent
upon someone reaching an age in excess of twenty-one.2
New York is the only jurisdiction that has applied its limited age
reduction statute. The New York courts have effectuated reductions in
age contingencies to twenty-one years without regard to their impor-
tance to the testators.8 3 In In re Molyneaux' Will' part of the principal
of a testamentary trust was to be paid to the testator's daughter when
she attained age thirty-five. 5 The testator imposed additional condi-
81. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
82. See, e.g., N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1976) which pro-
vides that:
Where an estate would ... be invalid because made to depend, for its vesting or
its duration, upon any person attaining or failing to attain an age in excess of
twenty-one years, the age contingency shall be reduced to twenty-one years as to
any or all persons subject to such contingency.
Id
See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-96 (West 1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(4) (West
Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 194(C)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 102 (1964); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-103(b) (1974); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184A, § 2 (West 1977). Professor Leach has referred to age reduction
statutes as merely as limited victory for cy pres. See Cy Pres on the March, supra note
38, at 1385. See also What Legislatures, Courts and Practitioners Can Do, supra note 35,
at 358-59 (age reduction statutes and other "bits and pieces" perpetuities legislation).
83. See In re Martin's Will, 58 Misc. 2d 740, 296 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1968); In re
Pendleton's Estate, 41 Misc. 2d 831, 246 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1964); In re von Gontard's Trust, 36
Misc. 2d 527, 233 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1962).
84. 44 Misc. 2d 159, 253 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1964).
85. Id. at 161, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 78. The testator created the trust by exercising a
power of appointment granted to him by his father. Id. The court held that in this situa-
tion the gift in trust "relates back" and is deemed to be part of the father's will. Id. at
163, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 80. The court stated that because the testator's daughter was not
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tions upon the gift expressly for the child's benefit." If she failed to
complete two academic years of college or another accredited school by
age thirty, a portion of the trust was to be paid instead to three educa-
tional institutions. If, before age thirty-five, the testator's daughter
joined a religious order that required her to surrender her property,
her interest was forfeited to named charitable and educational institu-
tions." Pursuant to the statute,89 the New York Surrogate's Court
reduced the age limitation to twenty-one years. 0 The court noted that
it had, in effect, excised the conditions imposed by the testator. 1 It
concluded, however, that the testator would not prefer the trust estate
to pass by intestacy, 2 and therefore effectuated an unconditional gift
to the daughter at age twenty-one. 93 To cy pres critics, the resulting
gift in Molyneaux may bear insufficient resemblance to the testator's
original plan. Because the terms of the age reduction statutes mandate
blanket reductions of age contingencies, it is not unlikely that they will
be applied to reduce age limitations despite their significance to the
testators. Moreover, courts may not be at liberty to refuse to apply
the statutes, and, inevitably, a testator's intent will become that which
happens to surface after a reduction. The Berry court has retained the
flexibility of assessing the importance of an age limitation and refusing
a reduction if it would reflect a testamentary design manifestly
unintended by the testator.
The jurisdictions which have applied cy pres to non-charitable gifts
have been guided by the principles of avoiding intestacy and effec-
tuating a testator's intent. Those jurisdictions which liberally effec-
tuate a general intent, elevate the avoidance of intestacy over the ef-
fectuation of a testator's intent." In order to avoid intestacy, these
jurisdictions may deviate further from a testator's true purpose when
modifying an instrument which violates the Rule. To cy pres critics,
alive at the death of her grandfather, she could not be a measuring life for her own gift
which thus fails as being payable more than 21 years after the death of the last valid
measuring life. Id. See N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 11 (repealed 1967) (current version at N.Y.
EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1 (McKinney 1976)); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42 (repealed
1967) (current version at N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1(a) (McKinney 1976)).
86. 44 Misc. 2d at 161, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 162, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
89. See N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 11-a (repealed 1967) (current version at N.Y. EST..
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1976)). See note 82 supra.
90. 44 Misc. 2d at 164, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id
94. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
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this result represents an impermissible willingness to invent a
dispositive scheme too alien to the testator's original plan.
The Berry court deviated from the liberal approach which seeks
always to effectuate a general intent, and chose a test for modification
that is more likely to result in intestacy in cases where a testator's in-
tent can only be served in a fashion proscribed by the Rule. Thus, the
Berry court's approach to modification constitutes a balance between
the two principles. On one hand, the equitable modification doctrine
adopted by Berry is a tool for avoiding intestacy caused by an or-
thodox application of the Rule. However, modification will not occur in
cases where it would demand too great a deviation from a testator's
true intent and reflect surmise about his preference when his critical
testamentary strategy has failed. Berry did not suggest standards to
be used to determine when a particular intent is critical. However, its
cy pres approach provides a foundation for the development of a doc-
trine which mitigates the harshness of the Rule without creating an
unintended purpose for a testator.
David R. High
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